Intel Management Engine: Difference between revisions
Added additional information about ME and AMT, removed some incomplete text. |
m somebody edited it before, however they did an amazing job and save me extra hours, thanks man! |
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The power state of the ME is independent from the rest of the system, allowing it to run while the system is turned off, assuming that the system is still receiving power.<ref name=":4" /> | The power state of the ME is independent from the rest of the system, allowing it to run while the system is turned off, assuming that the system is still receiving power.<ref name=":4" /> | ||
Additionally, Intel ME also contains several measures to check if it's been tampered with. Several of these measures conclude being inaccessible to the machine BIOS or chosen Operating System, scanning the entire machine every 30 minutes to verify if signature is signed or else the entire machine shutdown, and making it exceptionally difficult to reverse engineer. | |||
Additionally, Intel ME also contains several measures to check if it's been tampered with. These include being inaccessible to the machine BIOS or OS, scanning the entire machine every 30 minutes to verify if signature is signed (otherwise shutting down the system), and making it exceptionally difficult to reverse engineer. | Additionally, Intel ME also contains several measures to check if it's been tampered with. These include being inaccessible to the machine BIOS or OS, scanning the entire machine every 30 minutes to verify if signature is signed (otherwise shutting down the system), and making it exceptionally difficult to reverse engineer. | ||
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==Security== | ==Security== | ||
Intel ME follows security by obscurity, a concept that if people are unable to view the code, then it makes it more secure, however it's known to be ineffective and posing a huge security risks. Leaves many of these vulnerabilities unpatchable. | Intel ME follows security by obscurity, a concept that if people are unable to view the code, then it makes it more secure, however it's known to be ineffective and posing a huge security risks. Leaves many of these vulnerabilities unpatchable. | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
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==Hidden Deals== | ==Hidden Deals== | ||
Around 2017, an undocumented flag was discovered that, when set, disables a large portion of the ME. This feature appears to have been requested by the NSA.<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Claburn |first=Thomas |date=29 Aug 2017 |title=Intel ME controller chip has secret kill switch |url=https://www.theregister.com/2017/08/29/intel_management_engine_can_be_disabled/ |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |website=The Register}}</ref> | Around 2017, an undocumented flag was discovered that, when set, disables a large portion of the ME. This feature appears to have been requested by the NSA.<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Claburn |first=Thomas |date=29 Aug 2017 |title=Intel ME controller chip has secret kill switch |url=https://www.theregister.com/2017/08/29/intel_management_engine_can_be_disabled/ |url-status=live |access-date=2026-02-04 |website=The Register}}</ref> | ||
==Tools and Tips== | ==Tools and Tips== | ||
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lQ8k79yNH2A | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lQ8k79yNH2A | ||
[[Category:{{PAGENAME}}]] | [[Category:{{PAGENAME}}]] | ||