Flock Safety: Difference between revisions

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*'''Expanded audio surveillance''': In 2025, Flock announced its Raven gunshot detection systems would begin listening for "human distress" sounds like screaming, expanding beyond gunshot detection to voice monitoring.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Guariglia |first=Matthew |date=2025-10-02 |title=Flock's Gunshot Detection Microphones Will Start Listening for Human Voices |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/flocks-gunshot-detection-microphones-will-start-listening-human-voices |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref>

*'''Undermining state shield laws''': Despite state laws protecting healthcare access, out-of-state officers from jurisdictions that criminalize abortion or gender-affirming care can access Flock data on residents of protective states.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Maass |first=Dave |date=7 Oct 2025 |title=Flock Safety and Texas Sheriff Claimed License Plate Search Was for a Missing Person. It Was an Abortion Investigation. |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/flock-safety-and-texas-sheriff-claimed-license-plate-search-was-missing-person-it |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref>

*'''Immigration enforcement:''' Research from the University of Washington Center for Human Rights documented systematic access to Flock data by federal immigration authorities, often in violation of state laws.<ref name=":0" /> This occurred through three methods: "front door" access where agencies directly shared data with Border Patrol; "back door" access via a default "National Lookup" setting that granted federal access without explicit local authorization; and "side door" searches where local officers ran searches on behalf of ICE.<ref name="~~UWImmigration~~" />

*'''Immigration enforcement:''' Research from the University of Washington Center for Human Rights documented systematic access to Flock data by federal immigration authorities, often in violation of state laws.<ref name=":0" /> This occurred through three methods: "front door" access where agencies directly shared data with Border Patrol; "back door" access via a default "National Lookup" setting that granted federal access without explicit local authorization; and "side door" searches where local officers ran searches on behalf of ICE.<ref name=":0" />

*'''Contractual privacy overreach:''' The ACLU of Massachusetts found that Flock's default service agreement grants the company a "worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free" license to disclose agency data for "investigative purposes," even if a local police department has chosen to restrict data sharing with other agencies.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Flock Can Share Driver-Surveillance Data Even When Police Departments Opt Out, And Other Flock Developments |url=https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/flock-massachusetts-and-updates |website=American Civil Liberties Union}}</ref>

===Business Model===

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 *'''Expanded audio surveillance''': In 2025, Flock announced its Raven gunshot detection systems would begin listening for "human distress" sounds like screaming, expanding beyond gunshot detection to voice monitoring.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Guariglia |first=Matthew |date=2025-10-02 |title=Flock's Gunshot Detection Microphones Will Start Listening for Human Voices |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/flocks-gunshot-detection-microphones-will-start-listening-human-voices |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref>
 *'''Undermining state shield laws''': Despite state laws protecting healthcare access, out-of-state officers from jurisdictions that criminalize abortion or gender-affirming care can access Flock data on residents of protective states.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Maass |first=Dave |date=7 Oct 2025 |title=Flock Safety and Texas Sheriff Claimed License Plate Search Was for a Missing Person. It Was an Abortion Investigation. |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/10/flock-safety-and-texas-sheriff-claimed-license-plate-search-was-missing-person-it |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation}}</ref>
-*'''Immigration enforcement:''' Research from the University of Washington Center for Human Rights documented systematic access to Flock data by federal immigration authorities, often in violation of state laws.<ref name=":0" /> This occurred through three methods: "front door" access where agencies directly shared data with Border Patrol; "back door" access via a default "National Lookup" setting that granted federal access without explicit local authorization; and "side door" searches where local officers ran searches on behalf of ICE.<ref name="UWImmigration" />
+*'''Immigration enforcement:''' Research from the University of Washington Center for Human Rights documented systematic access to Flock data by federal immigration authorities, often in violation of state laws.<ref name=":0" /> This occurred through three methods: "front door" access where agencies directly shared data with Border Patrol; "back door" access via a default "National Lookup" setting that granted federal access without explicit local authorization; and "side door" searches where local officers ran searches on behalf of ICE.<ref name=":0" />
 *'''Contractual privacy overreach:''' The ACLU of Massachusetts found that Flock's default service agreement grants the company a "worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free" license to disclose agency data for "investigative purposes," even if a local police department has chosen to restrict data sharing with other agencies.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Flock Can Share Driver-Surveillance Data Even When Police Departments Opt Out, And Other Flock Developments |url=https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/flock-massachusetts-and-updates |website=American Civil Liberties Union}}</ref>
 ===Business Model===